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Abstract
Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and
very general mathematical framework for modelling
choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able
to represent the set-valued choices that appear in
imprecise-probabilistic decision making. We provide
these choice functions with a clear interpretation in
terms of desirability, use this interpretation to derive
a set of basic coherence axioms, and show that this
notion of coherence leads to a representation in terms
of sets of strict preference orders. By imposing ad-
ditional properties such as totality, the mixing prop-
erty and Archimedeanity, we obtain representation in
terms of sets of strict total orders, lexicographic prob-
ability systems, coherent lower previsions or linear
previsions.
Keywords: choice functions, coherence, desirability,
representation, non-binary choice models.
1. Introduction
Choice functions provide an elegant unifying mathematical
framework for studying set-valued choice: when presented
with a set of options, they generally return a subset of them.
If this subset is a singleton, it provides a unique optimal
choice or decision. But if the answer contains multiple
options, these are incomparable and no decision is made
between them. Such set-valued choices are a typical feature
of decision criteria based on imprecise-probabilistic uncer-
tainy models, which aim to make reliable decisions in the
face of severe uncertainty. Maximality and E-admissibility
are well-known examples. When working with a choice
function, however, it is immaterial whether it is based on
such a decision criterion. The primitive objects on this ap-
proach are simply the set-valued choices themselves, and
the choice function that represents all these choices serves
as an uncertainty model in and by itself.
The seminal work by Seidenfeld et al. [17] has shown
that a strong advantage of working with choice functions is
that they allow us to impose axioms on choices, aimed at
characterising what it means for choices to be rational and
internally consistent. This is also what we want to do here,
but we believe our angle of approach to be novel and unique:
rather than think of choice intuitively, we provide it with a
concrete interpretation in terms of desirability [4, 8, 9, 25]
or binary preference [15]. Another important feature of
our approach is that we consider a very general setting,
where the options form an abstract real vector space; horse
lotteries and gambles correspond to special cases.
The basic structure of our paper is as follows. We start
in Section 2 by introducing choice functions and our in-
terpretation for them. Next, in Section 3, we develop an
equivalent way of describing these choice functions: sets of
desirable option sets. We use our interpretation to suggest
and motivate a number of rationality, or coherence, axioms
for such sets of desirable option sets, and show in Section 4
what are the corresponding coherence axioms for choice (or
rejection) functions. Section 5 deals with the special case
of binary choice, and its relation to the theory of sets of
desirable options [4, 8, 9, 25] and binary preference. This
is important because our main result in Section 6 shows
that any coherent choice model can be represented in terms
of sets of such binary choice models. In the remaining
Sections 7–9, we consider additional axioms or properties,
such as totality, the mixing property, and an Archimedean
property, and prove corresponding representation results.
This includes representations in terms of sets of strict total
orders, sets of lexicographic probability systems, sets of
coherent lower previsions and sets of linear previsions.
Proofs have been relegated to the appendix of an exten-
ded arXiv version [7].
2. Choice Functions and Their
Interpretation
A choice function C is a set-valued operator on sets of
options. In particular, for any set of options A, the cor-
responding value of C is a subset C(A) of A. The op-
tions themselves are typically actions amongst which a
subject wishes to choose. We here follow a very general
approach where these options constitute an abstract real
vector space V provided with a—so-called background—
vector ordering  and a strict version ≺. The elements u
of V are called options and V is therefore called the op-
tion space. We let V0 := {u ∈ V : u  0}. The purpose
of a choice function is to represent our subject’s choices
between such options.
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Our motivation for adopting this general framework
where options are elements of abstract vector spaces, rather
than the more familiar one that focuses on choice between,
say, horse lotteries [2, 3, 11, 15, 17], is its applicability to
various contexts.
A typical set-up that is customary in decision theory, for
example, is one where every option has a corresponding re-
ward that depends on the state of a variable X , about which
the subject is uncertain. Hence, the reward is uncertain too.
As a special case, therefore, we can consider that the vari-
able X takes values x in a set of statesX . The reward that
corresponds to a given option is then a function u on X .
If we assume that this reward can be expressed in terms of
a real-valued linear utility scale, this allows us to identify
every act with a real-valued map on X . These maps are
often taken to be bounded and are then called gambles on X .
In this context, we can consider the different gambles on X
as our options, and let V be the set of all such gambles.
Two popular choices for V0 are then
{u ∈ V : u ≥ 0 and u 6= 0} or {u ∈ V : infu > 0},
where ≥ represents the point-wise ordering of gambles.
A more general framework, which allows us to dispense
with the linearity assumption of the utility scale, consists in
considering as option space the linear space of all bounded
real-valued maps on the setX ×R, whereR is a (finite)
set of rewards. Zaffalon and Miranda [26] have shown that,
in a context of binary preference relations, this leads to a
theory that is essentially equivalent to the classical horse
lottery approach. It tends, however, to be more elegant,
because a linear space is typically easier to work with than
a convex set of horse lotteries. Van Camp [21] has shown
that this idea can be straightforwardly extended from binary
preference relations to the more general context of choice
functions. We follow his lead in focusing on linear spaces
of options here.
In both of the above-mentioned cases, the options are still
bounded real-valued maps. In fairly recent work, Van Camp
et al. [21, 22] have shown that a notion of indifference
can be associated with choice functions quite easily, by
moving from the original option space to its quotient space
with respect to the linear subspace of all options that are
assessed to be equivalent to the zero option. Even when the
original options are real-valued maps, the elements of the
quotient space will be equivalence classes of such maps—
affine subspaces of the original option space—which can
no longer be straightforwardly identified with real-valued
maps. This provides even more incentives for considering
options to be vectors in some abstract linear space V .
Having introduced and motivated our abstract option
space V , sets of options can now be identified with subsets
of V , which we call option sets. We restrict our attention
here to finite option sets and will useQ to denote the set of
all such finite subsets of V , including the empty set.
Definition 1 A choice function C is a map from Q to Q
such that C(A)⊆ A for every A ∈Q.
Options in A that do not belong to C(A) are said to be
rejected. This leads to an alternative but equivalent rep-
resentation in terms of rejection functions: the rejection
function RC corresponding to a choice function C is a map
fromQ toQ, defined by RC(A) := A \C(A) for all A ∈Q.
Alternatively, a rejection function R can also be in-
dependently defined as a map from Q to Q such that
R(A) ⊆ A for all A ∈Q. The corresponding choice func-
tion CR is then clearly defined by CR(A) := A \R(A) for all
A ∈Q. Since a choice function is completely determined
by its rejection function, any interpretation for rejection
functions automatically implies an interpretation for choice
functions. This allows us to focus on the former.
Our interpretation for rejection functions—and therefore
also for choice functions—now goes as follows. Consider
a subject whose uncertainty is represented by a rejection
function R, or equivalently, by a choice function CR . Then
for a given option set A ∈Q, the statement that an option
u ∈ A is rejected from A—that is, that u ∈ R(A)—is taken
to mean that there is at least one option v in A that our
subject strictly prefers over u.
If we denote the strict preference of one option v over
another option u by vBu, this can be written succinctly as
(∀A ∈Q)(∀u ∈ A)(u ∈ R(A)⇔ (∃v ∈ A)vBu). (1)
In this paper, such a statement—as well as statements such
as those in Equations (2) and (3)—will be interpreted as
providing information about a strict preference relation B,
that may or may not be known or specified. The only re-
quirements that we impose on B is that it should be a strict
partial order that extends the background ordering  and is
compatible with the vector space operations on V :
B0. B is irreflexive: for all u ∈ V , u 6Bu;
B1. B is transitive: for all u,v,w ∈ V , uB v and vBw
imply that also uBw;
B2. for all u,v ∈ V , u  v implies that uB v;
B3. for all u,v,w ∈V , uBv implies that—so is equivalent
with—u +wB v +w;
B4. for all u,v ∈ V and all λ > 0, uB v implies that—so
is equivalent with—λuBλv.
We then call such a preference ordering B coherent. Equa-
tion (1) now implies that for all A ∈Q and u ∈ A:
u ∈ R(A)⇔ (∃v ∈ A)v−uB0
⇔ (∃v ∈ A \{u})v−uB0, (2)
where we use Axiom B3 for the first equivalence, and
Axiom B0 for the second. Both equivalences can be con-
veniently turned into a single one if we no longer require
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that u should belong to A and consider statements of the
form u ∈ R(A∪{u}). Equation (2) then turns into
u ∈ R(A∪{u})⇔ (∃v ∈ A)v−uB0, (3)
for all u ∈V and A ∈Q. So, according to our interpretation,
the statement that u is rejected from A ∪{u} is taken to
mean that the option set
A−u := {v−u : v ∈ A} (4)
contains at least one option that, according to B, is strictly
preferred to the zero option 0.
3. Coherent Sets of Desirable Option Sets
A crucial observation at this point is that our interpretation
for rejection functions does not require our subject to spe-
cify the strict preference B. Instead, all that is needed is for
her to specify option sets A ∈Q that—to her—contain at
least one option that is strictly preferred to the zero option 0.
Options that are strictly preferred to zero—so options u for
which uB0—are also called desirable, which is why we
will call such option sets desirable option sets and collect
them in a set of desirable option sets K ⊆Q. Our interpret-
ation therefore allows a modeller to specify her beliefs by
specifying a set of desirable option sets K ⊆Q.
As can be seen from Equations (3) and (4), such a set of
desirable option sets K completely determines a rejection
function R and its corresponding choice function CR :
(∀u ∈ V )(∀A ∈Q)(u ∈ R(A∪{u})⇔ A−u ∈ K). (5)
Our interpretation, together with the basic Axioms B0
and B3, therefore allows the study of rejection and choice
functions to be reduced to the study of sets of desirable
option sets.
We let K denote the set of all sets of desirable option sets
K ⊆Q, and consider any such K ∈ K. The first question
to address is when to call K coherent: which properties
should we impose on a set of desirable option sets in order
for it to reflect a rational subject’s beliefs? We propose the
following axiomatisation, using (λ ,µ)> 0 as a shorthand
notation for ‘λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0 and λ +µ > 0’.
Definition 2 A set of desirable option sets K⊆Q is called
coherent if it satisfies the following axioms:
K0. if A ∈ K then also A \{0} ∈ K, for all A ∈Q;
K1. {0} /∈ K;
K2. {u} ∈ K, for all u ∈ V0;
K3. if A1,A2 ∈ K and if, for all u ∈ A1 and v ∈ A2,
(λu,v ,µu,v)> 0, then also1
{λu,vu +µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2} ∈ K;
K4. if A1 ∈ K and A1 ⊆ A2 ∈Q, then also A2 ∈ K.
We denote the set of all coherent sets of desirable option
sets by K.
This axiomatisation is entirely based on our interpretation
and the following three axioms for desirability:
d1. 0 is not desirable;
d2. all u ∈ V0 are desirable;
d3. if u,v are desirable and (λ ,µ) > 0, then λu + µv is
desirable.
Each of these three axioms follows trivially from our as-
sumptions on the preference relation B: Axiom d1 follows
fromB0, Axiom d2 follows fromB2 and Axiom d3 follows
from B1 and B4.2
That the coherence Axioms K0–K4 are implied by our
rationality requirements d1–d3 for the concept of desirab-
ility, can now be seen as follows. Since a desirable option
set is by definition a set of options that contains at least
one desirable option, Axiom K4 is immediate. Axioms K0
and K1 follow naturally from d1, and Axiom K2 is an im-
mediate consequence of d2. The argument for Axiom K3
is more subtle. Since A1 and A2 are two desirable option
sets, there must be at least one desirable option u ∈ A1 and
one desirable option v ∈ A2. Since for these two options,
the positive linear combination λu,vu +µu,vv is again de-
sirable by d3, at least one of the elements of the option set
{λu,vu +µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2}must be a desirable option.
Hence, it must be a desirable option set.
4. Coherent Rejection Functions
Now that we have formulated our basic rationality require-
ments K0–K4 for a set of desirable option sets K, we are in
a position to use their link (5) with rejection functions to
derive equivalent rationality requirements for the latter.
Equation (5) already allows us to derive a first and very
basic axiom for rejection functions—and a very similar one
for choice functions, left implicit here—without imposing
any requirements on the set of desirable option sets K:
R0. for all A ∈Q and u ∈ A: u ∈ R(A)⇔ 0 ∈ R(A−u).
1. The following simple example might help the reader understand
what this axiom allows for. Consider any two a,b ∈ V , let A1 =
A2 =A := {a,b} and choose (λa,a,µa,a)= (1,0), (λa,b,µa,b)= (1,1),
(λb,a,µb,a) = (1,1) and (λb,b,µb,b) = (1,1). Then if A∈K, it follows
from Axiom K3 that also {a,a+b,2b} ∈ K.
2. Conversely, under Axiom B3 for the preference relation B, these
three Axioms d1–d3 imply the remaining Axioms B0–B2 and B4.
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When we do impose requirements on sets of desirable
option sets K, Equation (5) allows us to turn them into re-
quirements for rejection (and hence also choice) functions.
In particular, we will see in Proposition 4 below that our
Axioms K0–K4 imply that
R1. R( /0) = /0, and R(A) 6= A for all A ∈Q \{ /0};
R2. 0 ∈ R({0,u}), for all u ∈ V0;
R3. if A1,A2 ∈Q, 0 ∈ R(A1 ∪{0}) and 0 ∈ R(A2 ∪{0})
and if (λu,v ,µu,v)> 0 for all u ∈ A1 and v ∈ A2, then
0 ∈ R({λu,vu +µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2}∪{0});
R4. if A1 ⊆ A2 then R(A1)⊆ R(A2), for all A1,A2 ∈Q.
Axiom R4 is Sen’s condition α [18, 19].
Definition 3 A rejection function R is called coherent if it
satisfies the Axioms R0–R4. A choice function C is called
coherent if the associated rejection function RC is.
Our next result establishes that these notions of coher-
ence are perfectly compatible with the coherence for sets
of desirable option sets that we introduced in Section 3.
Proposition 4 Consider any set of desirable option sets
K ∈K and any rejection function R that are connected by
Equation (5). Then K is coherent if and only if R is.
We will from now on work directly with (coherent) sets
of desirable option sets and will use the collective term
(coherent) choice models for (coherent) choice functions,
rejection functions, and sets of desirable option sets. Of
course, our primary motivation for studying coherent sets
of desirable option sets is their connection with the other
two choice models. This being said, it should however also
be clear that our results do not depend on this connection.
The theory of sets of desirable option sets that we are about
to develop can therefore be used independently as well.
5. The Special Case of Binary Choice
According to our interpretation, the statement that A be-
longs to a set of desirable option sets K is taken to mean that
A contains at least one desirable option. This implies that
singletons play a special role: for any u ∈ V , stating that
{u} ∈ K is equivalent to stating that u is desirable. For any
set of desirable option sets K, these singleton assessments
are captured completely by the set of options
DK := {u ∈ V : {u} ∈ K}
that, according to K, are definitely desirable—preferred to
0. A set of desirable option sets K ∈K that is completely
determined by such singleton assessments is called binary.
Definition 5 A set of desirable option sets K is binary if
A ∈ K⇔ (∃u ∈ A){u} ∈ K, for all A ∈Q.
In order to explain how any binary set of desirable option
sets K is indeed completely determined by DK , we need a
way to associate a rejection function with sets of options
such as DK . To that end, we consider the notion of a set
of desirable options: a subset D of V whose interpretation
will be that it consists of the options u ∈ V that our subject
considers desirable. We denote the set of all such sets of
desirable options D ⊆ V by D.
With any D ∈ D, our interpretation for rejection func-
tions in Section 2 inspires us to associate a set of desirable
option sets KD , defined by
KD := {A ∈Q : A∩D 6= /0}.
It turns out that a set of desirable options sets K is binary if
and only if it has the form KD , and the unique representing
D is then given by DK .
Proposition 6 A set of desirable options sets K ∈ K is
binary if and only if there is some D ∈D such that K = KD .
This D is then necessarily unique, and equal to DK .
Just like we did for sets of desirable option sets in Sec-
tion 3, we can use the basic rationality principles d1–d3 for
the notion of desirability—or binary preference—to infer
basic rationality criteria for sets of desirable options. When
they do, we call them coherent.
Definition 7 A set of desirable options D ∈ D is called
coherent if it satisfies the following axioms:3
D1. 0 /∈ D;
D2. V0 ⊆ D;
D3. if u,v ∈ D and (λ ,µ)> 0, then λu +µv ∈ D.
D denotes the set of all coherent sets of desirable options.
So a coherent set of desirable options is a convex cone
[Axiom D3] in V that does not contain 0 [Axiom D1] and
includes V0 [Axiom D2]. Sets of desirable options are an
abstract version of the sets of desirable gambles that have
an important part in the literature on imprecise probability
models [4, 9, 12, 25]. This abstraction was first introduced
and studied in great detail in [8, 14].
Our next result shows that the coherence of a binary set
of desirable option sets is completely determined by the
coherence of its corresponding set of desirable options.
3. The Axioms D1–D3 for sets of desirable options should not be con-
fused with the rationality criteria d1–d3 for our primitive notion of
desirability—or binary preference. Like the Axioms K0–K4, they are
only derived from these primitive assumptions on the basis of their
interpretation.
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Proposition 8 Consider any binary set of desirable option
sets K ∈ K and let DK ∈ D be its corresponding set of
desirable options. Then K is coherent if and only if DK is.
Conversely, consider any set of desirable options D ∈ D
and let KD be its corresponding binary set of desirable
option sets, then KD is coherent if and only if D is.
So the binary coherent sets of desirable option sets are given
by {KD : D ∈ D}, allowing us to call any coherent set of
desirable option sets in K\{KD : D ∈ D} non-binary.
What makes coherent sets of desirable options D ∈ D—
and hence also coherent binary sets of desirable option
sets—particularly interesting is that they induce a bin-
ary preference order BD—a strict vector ordering—on V ,
defined by uBD v⇔ u− v ∈ D, for all u,v ∈ V . The pref-
erence order BD is coherent—satisfies Axioms B0–B4—
and furthermore fully characterises D: one can easily see
that u ∈ D if and only if u BD 0. Hence, coherent sets
of desirable options and coherent binary sets of desirable
option sets are completely determined by a single binary
strict preference order between options. This is of course
the reason why we reserve the moniker binary for choice
models that are essentially based on singleton assessments.
6. Representation in Terms of Sets of
Desirable Options
It should be clear—and it should be stressed—at this point
that making a direct desirability assessment for an option
u typically requires more of a subject than assessing the
desirability of an option set A: the former requires that our
subject should state that u is desirable, while the latter only
requires the subject to state that some option in A is desir-
able, but not to specify which. It is this difference—this
greater latitude in making assessments—that guarantees
that our account of choice is much richer than one that is
purely based on binary preference. In the framework of sets
of desirable option sets, it is for instance possible to express
the belief that at least one of two options u or v is desirable,
while remaining undecided about which of them actually
is; in order to express this belief, it suffices to state that
{u,v} ∈ K. This is not possible in the framework of sets
of desirable options. Sets of desirable option sets therefore
constitute a much more general uncertainty framework than
sets of desirable options.
So while it is nice that there are sets of desirable option
sets KD that are completely determined by a set of desirable
options D, such binary choice models are typically not what
we are interested in here. No, it is the non-binary coherent
choice models that we have in our sights. If we replace
such a non-binary coherent set of desirable option sets K
by its corresponding set of desirable options DK , we lose
information, because then necessarily KDK ⊂ K. Choice
models are therefore more expressive than sets of desirable
options. But it turns out that our coherence axioms lead
to a representation result that allows us to still use sets of
desirable options, or rather, sets of them, to completely
characterise any coherent choice model.
Theorem 9 A set of desirable option sets K ∈K is coher-
ent if and only if there is a non-empty setD ⊆D of coherent
sets of desirable options such that K =
⋂{KD : D ∈D}.
The largest such set D is then D(K) := {D ∈ D : K ⊆ KD}.
Due to the one-to-one correspondence between coherent
sets of desirable options D and coherent preference or-
ders BD , this representation result tells us that working
with a coherent set of desirable option sets K is equival-
ent to working with the set of those coherent preference
orders BD for which K ⊆ KD . For the rejection function
R that corresponds to K through Equation (5), u ∈ R(A)
means that u is dominated in A for all these representing co-
herent preference orders BD . Similarly, u ∈CR(A) means
that u is undominated according to at least one of these rep-
resenting coherent preference orders BD . This effectively
tells us that our coherence axioms K0–K4 for choice mod-
els characterise a generalised type of choice under Levi’s
notion of E-admissibility [10, 20, 22], but with representing
preference orders BD that need not be total orders based
on comparing expectations.
Interestingly, any potential property of sets of desirable
option sets that is preserved under taking arbitrary intersec-
tions, and that the binary choice models satisfy, is inherited
from the binary models through the representation result of
Theorem 9. It is easy to see that this applies in particular to
Aizermann’s condition [1].
7. Imposing Totality
We have just shown that every coherent choice model K can
be represented by a collection of coherent sets of desirable
options D. This leads us to wonder whether it is possible
to achieve representation using only particular types of
coherent D, and, if yes, for which types of coherent sets
of desirable option sets K—and hence for which types
of rejection functions R and choice functions C—this is
possible. In this section, we clear the air by starting with a
rather simple case, where we restrict attention to total sets
of desirable options D, corresponding to total preference
orders BD .
Definition 10 We call a set of desirable options D ∈ D
total if it is coherent and
DT. for all u ∈ V \{0}, either u ∈ D or −u ∈ D.
DT denotes the set of all total sets of desirable options.
That the binary preference order BD corresponding to a
total set of desirable options D is indeed a total order can
be seen as follows. For all u,v ∈ V such that u 6= v, the
property DT implies that either u− v ∈ D or v− u ∈ D.
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Hence, for all u,v ∈ V , we have that either u = v, uBD v
or vBD u, which indeed makes BD a total order.
It was shown in [4, 9] that what we call total sets of
desirable options here, are precisely the maximal or undom-
inated coherent ones, i.e. those coherent D ∈ D that are
not included in any other coherent set of desirable option
sets: (∀D′ ∈D)(D ⊆D′⇒D = D′). The question of which
types of binary sets of desirable option sets KD the total D
correspond to, is answered by the following definition and
proposition.
Definition 11 We call a set of desirable option sets K ∈K
total if it is coherent and
KT. {u,−u} ∈ K for all u ∈ V \{0}.
KT denotes the set of all total sets of desirable options. .
Proposition 12 For any set of desirable options D ∈ D,
D is total if and only if KD is, so KD ∈KT⇔ D ∈ DT.
So a binary K is total if and only if its corresponding DK
is. For general total sets of desirable option sets K ∈ KT,
which are not necessarily binary, we nevertheless still have
representation in terms of total binary ones.
Theorem 13 A set of desirable option sets K ∈K is total
if and only if there is a non-empty set D ⊆ DT of total sets
of desirable options such that K =
⋂{KD : D ∈D}. The
largest such set D is then DT(K) := {D ∈ DT : K ⊆ KD}.
This representation result shows that our total choice mod-
els correspond to a generalised type of choice under Levi’s
notion of E-admissibility [10, 20], but with representing
preference orders BD that are now maximal, or undomin-
ated. They correspond to what Van Camp et al. [22, Sec-
tion 4] have called M-admissible choice models. Our dis-
cussion above provides an axiomatic characterisation for
such choice models.
We conclude our study of totality by characterising what
it means for a rejection function to be total.
Proposition 14 Consider a set of desirable option
sets K ∈ K and a rejection function R that are connec-
ted by Equation (5). Then K is total if and only if R is
coherent and satisfies
RT. 0 ∈ R({0,u,−u}), for all u ∈ V \{0}.
8. Imposing the Mixing Property
Totality is, of course, a very strong requirement, and it leads
to a very special and restrictive type of representation. We
therefore now turn to weaker requirements, and their con-
sequences for representation. One such additional property,
which sometimes pops up in the literature about choice
and rejection functions, is the following mixing property
[17, 21], which asserts that an option that is rejected contin-
ues to be rejected if one removes mixed options—convex
combinations of other options in the option set:4
RM. if A ⊆ B ⊆ conv(A) then also R(B)∩A ⊆ R(A), for
all A,B ∈Q,
where conv(·) is the convex hull operator, defined by
conv(V ) :=
{ n
∑
k=1
λkuk : n∈N,λk ∈R>0,
n
∑
k=1
λk = 1,uk ∈V
}
for all V ⊆ V. N is the set of natural numbers, excluding 0,
and R>0 is the set of all (strictly) positive reals. A rejection
function that satisfies this mixing property is called mixing.
The following result characterises the mixing property
in terms of the corresponding set of desirable option sets.
We provide two equivalent conditions: one in terms of
the convex hull operator, and one in terms of the posi(·)
operator, which, for any subset V of V , returns the set of
all positive linear combinations of its elements:
posi(V ) :=
{ n
∑
k=1
λkuk : n ∈ N,λk ∈ R>0,uk ∈V
}
.
Proposition 15 Consider any set of desirable option
sets K ∈K and any rejection function R that are connected
by Equation (5). Then R is coherent and mixing if and only
if K is coherent and satisfies any—and hence both—of the
following conditions:
KM. if B ∈ K and A ⊆ B ⊆ posi(A), then also A ∈ K, for
all A,B ∈Q;
K′M. if B ∈ K and A ⊆ B ⊆ conv(A), then also A ∈ K, for
all A,B ∈Q.
In the context of sets of desirable options in linear spaces,
we prefer to use the posi(·) operator because it fits more
naturally with d3. We therefore adopt KM in our definition
for mixingness.
Definition 16 We call a set of desirable option sets K ∈K
mixing if it is coherent and satisfies KM. The set of all
mixing sets of desirable option sets is denoted by KM.
We now proceed to show that these mixing sets of de-
sirable option sets allow for a representation in terms of
sets of desirable options that are themselves mixing, in the
following sense.
Definition 17 We call a set of desirable options D ∈ D
mixing if it is coherent and satisfies
4. Van Camp [21] refers to this property as ‘convexity’, but we prefer
to stick to the original name suggested by Seidenfeld et al. [17] for
the sake of avoiding confusion. We nevertheless want to point out
that in a context that focuses on rejection rather than choice, the term
‘unmixing’ would be preferable, because the rejection is preserved
under removing mixed options—whereas the choice is preserved
under adding mixed options.
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DM. for all A ∈Q, if posi(A)∩D 6= /0, then also A∩D 6= /0.
DM denotes the set of all mixing sets of desirable options.
The binary elements of KM are precisely the ones based
on such a mixing set of desirable options; they can be
represented by a single element of DM.
Proposition 18 For any set of desirable options D ∈ D,
KD is mixing if and only if D is, so KD ∈KM⇔ D ∈ DM.
For general mixing sets of desirable option sets that are not
necessarily binary, we nevertheless still obtain a represent-
ation theorem analogous to Theorems 9 and 13, where the
representing sets of desirable options are now mixing.
Theorem 19 A set of desirable option sets K∈K is mixing
if and only if there is a non-empty setD ⊆DM of mixing sets
of desirable options such that K =
⋂{KD : D ∈D}. The
largest such set D is then DM(K) := {D ∈ DM : K ⊆ KD}.
This representation result is akin to the one proved by
Seidenfeld et al [17], but without the additional condition
of weak Archimedeanity they impose. In order to better
explain this, and to provide this result with some extra intu-
ition, we take a closer look at the mixing sets of desirable
options that make up our representation. The following
result is an equivalent characterisation of such sets.
Proposition 20 Consider any coherent set of desirable
options D ∈ D and let Dc := V \D. Then D is mixing if
and only if posi(Dc) = Dc.
So we see that the coherent sets of desirable options that
are also mixing are precisely those whose complement is
again a convex cone.5 They are therefore identical to the
lexicographic sets of desirable options sets introduced by
Van Camp et al. [21, 23]. What makes this particularly
relevant and interesting is that these authors have shown
that when V is the set of all gambles on some finite setX
and V0 = {u ∈ V : u ≥ 0 and u 6= 0}, then the sets of de-
sirable options in D that are lexicographic—and therefore
mixing—are exactly the ones that are representable by
some lexicographic probability system that has no non-
trivial Savage-null events. This is, of course, the reason
why they decided to call such coherent sets of desirable op-
tions lexicographic. Because of this connection, it follows
that in their setting, Theorem 19 implies that every mixing
choice model can be represented by a set of lexicographic
probability systems.
Due to the equivalence between coherent lexicographic
sets of desirable options and mixing ones on the one hand,
and between total sets of desirable options and maximal
coherent ones on the other, the following proposition is an
5. Recall that coherent sets of desirable options are convex cones be-
cause of Axiom D3.
immediate consequence of a similar result by Van Camp et
al. [21, 23]. It shows that the total sets of desirable options
constitute a subclass of the mixing ones: mixingness is a
weaker requirement than totality.
Proposition 21 Every total set of desirable options is mix-
ing: DT ⊆ DM.
By combining this result with Theorems 13 and 19, it fol-
lows that every total set of desirable options sets is mixing,
and similarly for rejection and choice functions. So mix-
ingness is implied by totality for non-binary choice models
as well. Since totality is arguably the more intuitive of the
two, one might therefore be inclined to discard the mix-
ing property in favour of totality. We have nevertheless
studied the mixing property in some detail, because it can
be combined with other properties, such as the notions of
Archimedeanity studied in the next section. As we will
see, this combination leads to very intuitive representation,
where the role of lexicographic probability systems is taken
over by expectation operators—called linear previsions.
9. Imposing Archimedeanity
There are a number of ways a notion of Archimedeanity can
be introduced for preference relations and choice models
[2, 3, 15, 17, 11]. Its aim is always to guarantee that the real
number system is expressive enough, or more precisely, that
the preferences expressed by the models can be represented
by (sets of) real-valued probabilities and utilities, rather
than, say, probabilities and utilities expressed using hyper-
reals. Here, we consider a notion of Archimedeanity that is
close in spirit to an idea explored by Walley [24, 25] in his
discussion of so-called strict desirability.
For the sake of simplicity, we will restrict ourselves
to a particular case of our abstract framework,6 where
V =L (X ) is the set of all gambles on a set of statesX
and V0 = {u ∈L (X ) : infu > 0}. We identify every
real number µ ∈ R with the constant gamble that takes
the value µ , and then define Archimedeanity as follows.
Definition 22 We call a set of desirable options D ∈ D
Archimedean if it is coherent and satisfies the following
openness condition:
DA. for all u ∈D, there is an ε ∈R>0 such that u−ε ∈D.
We denote the set of all Archimedean sets of desirable
options by DA, and let DM,A be the set of all Archimedean
sets of desirable options that are also mixing.
What makes Archimedean and mixing Archimedean sets
of desirable options particularly interesting, is that they
are in a one-to-one correspondence with coherent lower
previsions and linear previsions [24], respectively.
6. It is possible to introduce a version of our notion of Archimedeanity
in our general framework as well, but explaining this would take up
much more space than we are allowed in this conference paper.
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Definition 23 A coherent lower prevision P onL (X ) is
a real-valued map onL (X ) that satisfies
LP1. P(u)≥ infu for all u ∈L (X );
LP2. P(λu) = λP(u) for all u ∈L (X ) and λ ∈ R>0;
LP3. P(u + v)≥ P(u)+P(v) for all u,v ∈L (X );
A linear prevision P on L (X ) is a coherent lower previ-
sion that additionally satisfies
P3. P(u + v) = P(u)+P(v) for all u,v ∈L (X );
We denote the set of all coherent lower previsions on
L (X ) by P and let P be the set of all linear previsions.
In order to make the aforementioned one-to-one corres-
pondences explicit, we introduce the following maps. With
any set of desirable options D in D, we associate a (possibly
extended) real functional PD onL (X ), defined by
PD(u) := sup{µ ∈ R : u−µ ∈ D}, for all u ∈L (X ).
Conversely, with any (possibly extended) real functional P
onL (X ), we associate a set of desirable options
DP := {u ∈L (X ) : P(u)> 0}.
Our next result shows that these maps lead to an isomorph-
ism between DA and P, and similarly for DM,A and P.
Proposition 24 For any Archimedean set of desirable op-
tions D, PD is a coherent lower prevision onL (X ) and
DPD = D. If D is moreover mixing, then PD is a linear
prevision. Conversely, for any coherent lower prevision P
onL (X ), DP is an Archimedean set of desirable options
and PDP = P. If P is furthermore a linear prevision, then
DP is mixing.
The importance of these correspondences is that any
representation in terms of sets of Archimedean (mixing)
sets of desirable options is effectively a representation in
terms of sets of coherent lower (or linear) previsions. As
we will see, these kinds of representations can be obtained
for sets of desirable option sets—and hence also rejection
and choice functions—that are themselves Archimedean in
the following sense.
Definition 25 We call a set of desirable option sets K ∈K
Archimedean if it is coherent and satisfies
KA. for all A ∈K, there is an ε ∈R>0 such that A−ε ∈K.
We denote the set of all Archimedean sets of desirable op-
tion sets by KA, and let KM,A be the set of all Archimedean
sets of desirable options that are also mixing.
This notion easily translates from sets of desirable option
sets to rejection functions.
Proposition 26 Consider any set of desirable option
sets K ∈K and any rejection function R that are connected
by Equation (5). Then K is Archimedean if and only if R is
coherent and satisfies
RA. for all A ∈Q and u ∈ V such that u ∈ R(A ∪{u}),
there is some ε ∈R>0 such that u ∈ R((A−ε)∪{u}).
A first and basic result is that our notion of Archimedean-
ity for sets of desirable option sets is compatible with that
for sets of desirable options.
Proposition 27 For any set of desirable options D ∈ D,
KD is Archimedean (and mixing) if and only if D is, so
KD ∈KA⇔ D ∈ DA and KD ∈KM,A⇔ D ∈ DM,A.
In order to state our representation results for
Archimedean choice models that are not necessarily binary,
we require a final piece of machinery: a topology on DA and
DM,A, or equivalently, a notion of closedness. We do this
by defining the convergence of a sequence of Archimedean
sets of desirable options {Dn}n∈N in terms of the point-wise
convergence of the corresponding sequence of coherent
lower previsions:
lim
n→+∞Dn = D⇔
(∀u ∈L (X )) lim
n→+∞PDn(u) = PD(u).
A set D ⊆ DA of Archimedean sets of desirable op-
tions is then called closed if it contains all of its limit
points, or equivalently, if the corresponding set of coherent
lower previsions—or linear previsions whenD ⊆DM,A—is
closed with respect to point-wise convergence.
Our final representation results state that a set of desir-
able option sets K is Archimedean if and only if it can
be represented by such a closed set, and if K is moreover
mixing, the elements of the representing closed set are as
well.
Theorem 28 A set of desirable option sets K ∈ K is
Archimedean if and only if there is some non-empty closed
set D ⊆ DA of Archimedean sets of desirable options such
that K =
⋂{KD : D ∈D}. The largest such set D is then
DA(K) := {D ∈ DA : K ⊆ KD}.
Theorem 29 A set of desirable option sets K ∈K is mix-
ing and Archimedean if and only if there is some non-empty
closed setD ⊆DM,A of mixing and Archimedean sets of de-
sirable options such that K =
⋂{KD : D ∈D}. The largest
such set D is then DM,A(K) := {D ∈ DM,A : K ⊆ KD}.
If we combine Theorem 29 with the correspondence res-
ult of Proposition 24, we see that Axioms K0–K4 together
with KM and KA characterise exactly those choice models
that are based on E-admissibility with respect to a closed—
but not necessarily convex—set of linear previsions. In
much the same way, Theorem 28 can be seen to charac-
terise a generalised notion of E-admissibility, where the
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representing objects are coherent lower previsions. Walley–
Sen maximality [20, 24] can be regarded as a special case
of this generalised notion, where only a single representing
coherent lower prevision is needed.
10. Conclusion
The main conclusion of this paper is that the language of
desirability is capable of representing non-binary choice
models, provided we extend it with a notion of disjunction,
allowing statements such as ‘at least one of these two op-
tions is desirable’. When we do so, the resulting framework
of sets of desirable options turns out to be a very flexible
and elegant tool for representing set-valued choice. Not
only does it include E-admissibility and maximality, it also
opens up a range of other types of choice functions that
have so far received little to no attention. All of these can
be represented in terms of sets of strict preference orders
or—if additional properties are imposed—in terms of sets
of strict total orders, sets of lexicographic probability sys-
tems, sets of coherent lower previsions or sets of linear
previsions.
Another important conclusion is that our axiomatisation
for general (possibly non-binary) choice models allows
for representations in terms of ‘atomic’ models, which in
themselves represent binary choice. However, this should
of course not be taken to mean that our choice models
are essentially binary. Indeed, it follows readily from our
representation theorems that the binary aspects DK of a
non-binary choice model K are captured by the intersec-
tions of the representing sets of desirable options, but the
representation is much more powerful than that, because it
also extends to the non-binary aspects of choice.
This distinction between the binary level and the non-
binary one also leads us to the following important words
of caution, which are akin to an earlier observation made by
Quaeghebeur [13]. At the binary level, choice is represented
by a set of desirable options, which can—under certain
assumptions such as Archimedeanity—be identified with a
convex closed set of linear previsions. We have also seen
in Theorem 29 that the (binary and non-binary) aspects of
mixing and Archimedean choice can be fully represented
by a closed set of mixing and Archimedean sets of desirable
options, each of which is, by Proposition 24, equivalent to
a linear prevision. So, in this case there is a representation
in terms of a set of linear previsions both at the binary level
and at the general (binary and non-binary) level, but these
two sets of linear previsions will typically be different, and
they play a very different role. To put it bluntly: sets of
linear previsions à la Walley [24] should not be confused
with sets of linear previsions—credal sets—à la Levi [10].
To conclude, what we have done here, in a very specific
sense, is to introduce a way of dealing with statements of
the type ‘there is some option in the option set A that is
strictly preferred to 0’. Axioms such as K0–K4 can then be
seen as the logical axioms—for deriving new statements
from old—that govern this language. Our representation
theorems provide a semantics for this language in terms of
desirability, and they show that the corresponding logical
system is sound and complete.
In our future work on this topic, we intend to invest-
igate how we can let go of the closedness condition in
Theorems 28 and 29. We expect to have to turn to other
types of Archimedeanity; variations on Seidenfeld et al.’s
weak Archimedeanity [17, 5] come to mind. We also intend
to show in more detail how the existing work on choice
models for horse lotteries [17] fits nicely within our more
general and abstract framework of choice on linear option
spaces. And finally, we intend to further develop conser-
vative inference methods for coherent choice functions, by
extending our earlier natural extension results [6] to the
more general setting that we have considered here.
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